

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 00786 131855Z

64

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SS-15 NSC-05 AEC-05 /066 W

----- 017808

R 131506Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0083

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T USNATO 0786

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFRO, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: NPG - ITALIAN COMMENTS ON PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT

REF: NPG/WP(74)9, DATED 4 DECEMBER 1974

MISSION PROVIDES BELOW TEXT OF ITALIAN COMMENTS ON THE PHASE II  
PRELIMINARY REPORT (REF) CIRCULATED BY THE ITALIAN DELEGATION.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. WE HAVE EXTENDED THE PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PHASE II OF THE  
FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY AND WE CONSIDER IT WELL CONSTRUCTED AND  
ACCEPTABLE AS A USEFUL BASE FOR NPG CONSIDERATION AND FOR  
PREPARATION OF PHASE III.

OF COURSE ONE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT THE STUDY IS DEVELOPED  
FROM A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF A LIMITED NUMBER  
OF ILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES (PHASE I STUDIES).

IN PARTICULAR, IT DOES NOT EXAMINE THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN ATTACK  
IN MORE

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 00786 131855Z

THAN ONE THEATRE AND DOES NOT MAKE DISTINCTIONS AMONG THE  
DIFFERENT SCOPES THAT THE ENEMY COULD PURSUE (MAJOR APPRESSION  
OR LIMITED ONE, LIMITED SCOPE IN THE ENEMY OBJECTIVES OR A  
BROADER ONE).

FURTHER MORE, HAVING CONFINED THE ENEMY RESPONSE EXAMINATION TO TWO ALTERNATIVES ONLY (RESPONSE IN KIND OR NON-NUCLEAR RESPONSE) THE STUDY SEEMS TO HAVE REACHED, AS A RESULT, A POLITICAL JUDGMENT OF THE FOLLOW-ON USE MORE THAN AN EVALUATION OF ITS UTILITY FROM A POLITICAL-MILITARY POINT OF VIEW.

2. BEARING IN MIND THE CONSIDERATIONS, ABOVE MENTIONED, WE SHARE THE BASIC CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY, I.E. THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OWING TO THE RESPONSE CAPABILITY AT THE SAME LEVEL AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY. ARE NOT IN A POSITION OF MILITARILY SOLVING A CONFLICT THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL TO CONTROL AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE IS STILL SUBSTANTIALLY ENTRUSTED WITH A WARNING AIMED AT LEADING THE ENEMY TO THE POLITICAL DECISION OF CEASING THE AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAWING. HOWEVER, IF THIS WARNING IS TO LEAD THE ENEMY TO CORRECT HIS MISCALCULATION WHICH IS AT THE BASIS OF HIS AGGRESSION, IT (THE FOLLOW-ON USE) SHOULD BE MUCH MORE CONVINCING THAT THE MESSAGE IMPLICIT IN INITIAL NUCLEAR USE, BOTH BECAUSE, AS NOTED BY THE ORIGINATORS OF THE STUDY, THE LATTER WOULD HAVE FAILED ITS DETERRENT OBJECTIVE AND BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF NATO, WITH ITS MOSAIC OF NATIONAL WILLS AND INTERESTS, MIGHT NECESSARILY APPEAR LESS CREDIBLE THAN THAT OF THE MONOLITHIC SOVIET BLOC.

IN SUCH A CONTEXT, IT ALSO APPEARS REALISTIC TO FORESEE THAT THE FOLLOW-ON USE WOULD BE URGENTLY NEEDED UNDER PRESSURE OF A MILITARY SITUATION COMPROMISED BY THE PROBABLE DELAY WITH WHICH INITIAL USE WOULD BE RELEASED BY THE ALLIANCE, RELUCTANT AS IT IS TO CROSS THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD VIS-A-VIS THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY IT.

THIS APPEARS TO LEAD NOT ONLY TOWARDS A DOSAGE WHICH WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY REFLECT THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVENESS IN TERMS OF MILITARY RESULTS, BUT ABOVE ALL TOWARDS A TIMELINESS OF INTERVENTION ADHERING IN SUCH A WAY TO THE OCCURRENCE OF THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH NUCLEAR USE APPEARS NECESSARY, AS TO  
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 00786 131855Z

DEMONSTRATE THE ACTUAL INTENTION OF THE ALLIANCE TO ACCEPT FURTHER ESCALATION FOR ITS OWN DEFENCE.

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, WE CONSIDER THAT BESIDES A CLEARER STRESS ON THE PECULIAR FEATURES OF TIMELINESS PROPER OF FOLLOW-ON USE IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE ALSO TO BETTER UNDERLINE, IN THE CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE HEADING OF "SCALE OF USE BY NATO", THE HIGHER IMPORTANCE THAT THE BATTLEFIELD REQUIREMENTS ASSUME IN THE FOLLOW-ON USE, WITH RESPECT TO INITIAL USE.

3. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE NEED IS CONFIRMED FOR MAINTAINING THE PRESENT TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY REQUIRED BY THE MACHINERY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AS AN EQUAL PROTAGONIST OF DETERRENCE.

IT IS EVIDENT, IN FACT, THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN AN ERA WHICH SEES THE STRATEGIC PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS.

FURTHERMORE WE THINK THAT:

- THE DETERRENT VALUE OF THE PRESENT TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, IN THE INITIAL AND IN THE FOLLOW-ON USES, WILL BE AS MORE EFFECTIVE AS MORE OPTIONS WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL;

- THE DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR NUCLEAR STRUCTURE IS DEPENDENT, FIRST OF ALL, FROM THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PICTURE OF SUCH A STRUCTURE WE ARE ABLE TO PROJECT TO THE ENEMY PERCEPTION.

4. FINALLY WE THINK THAT PERHAPS COULD BE ADVISABLE THAT THE PHASE III (FORMULATION OF POLICY GUIDANCE FOR FOLLOW-ON USE) BE INITIATED ONLY AFTER THE CONCLUSIONS ON THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY ARE REACHED AND A CLEARER VIEW ON THE DEFENSIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE NEW WEAPONS IS ACHIEVED.

END TEXT.  
BRUCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 FEB 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO00786  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrziek.tel  
**Line Count:** 134  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** NPG/WP(74)9, DATED 4 DECEMBER 1974  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <22 APR 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <22 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** NPG - ITALIAN COMMENTS ON PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT  
**TAGS:** PFRO, NATO, MNUC  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR  
USNMR SHAPE  
USLOSACLANT  
CINCLANT  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006